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ABSTRACT
RE-ORGANIZATION OF SUMERBANK
A Study of Strategic Responses to Environmental Change
Cihan Erkul
Master of Business Administration 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. limit Berkman 
February, 1989, v +  46 pages
The new economic environment in Turkey after the 1980 reforms posed strategic 
challenges to firms. The study of these challenges and of the actual responses of 
firms to these challenges in the form of new strategies may provide interesting case 
studies for management theory. In this thesis the strategic responses of a state 
economic enterprise, Sumerbank, to environmental changes are investigated. 
Sumerbank's strategy, formulated and implemented after 1982, was successful in 
many respects. However, it was not possible to procure the funds required for 
modernization investments because of governmental policies. As a result, the new 
strategy failed to enhance the profitability and viability of Sumerbank.
Keywords: Environment, Environmental Change, Strategy, State Economic 
Enterprises, Sumerbank.
ÖZET
SUMERBANK’IN RE-ORGANİZASYONU 
Ortamdaki Değişime Stratejik Tepkiler Üzerine Bir Çalışma
Cihan Erkul
MBA Yüksek Lisans Tezi 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Ümit Berkman 
Şubat 1989, v + 46 sayla
'l'ürkiye’de 1980 reformliirııuhın sonra oluşan yeni ekonomik ortam firmaları 
stratejilerini değiştirmelerine neden olmuştur. Ortamdaki değişiklerin firmalar 
üzerindeki etkilerinin ve firmaların bu etkilere gösterdikleri stratejik tepkilerin 
incelenmesi işletme yönetimi kuramı açısından ilginç olacaktır. Bu tezde, 
Türkiye’deki bir kamu iktisadi teşebbüsünün, Sümerbank’ın, ortamdaki değişiklere 
gösterdiği stratejik tepkiler incelenmiştir. Sümerbank’ın 1982 sonrası geliştirdiği yeni 
strateji bir çok bakımdan başarılı olmuştur. Ancak, bu dönemdeki hükümet 
politikaları nedeniyle, modernizasyon yatırımları için gerekli kaynaklar 
bulunamamıştır. Bu nedenle, yeni strateji Sümerbank’ın karlılığının artırılmasını 
sağlayamamıştır.
Analılar kelimeler; Ortam, Ortamdaki Değişim, Strateji, Kamu İktisadi Teşebbüsleri, 
Sümerbank.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The firms operate in a dynamic environment. Socio-economic, technological, 
competitive and governmental factors which characterize the environment of a firm 
change continuously. A successful firm should revise its strategies in the face of 
these changes. A failure to adapt to environmental changes may lead to stagnation 
and finally to the bankruptcy of the firm.
The study of the responses of firms to environmental change is one of the most 
important fields of management research. Such studies show how firms alter their 
strategies in the face of new environmental factors and serve to demonstrate the 
effects of new strategies on the operations of the firm. In these studies, the 
management theory is applied to facts of business life.
The new economic environment in Turkey after the 1980 reforms posed strategic 
challenges to firms. The study of these challenges and of the actual responses of 
firms to these challenges in the form of new strategies may provide interesting case 
studies for the management theory.
In this thesis, a state economic enterprise, Sumerbank, is selected for this type of 
analysis. Sumerbank is one of the oldest state economic enterprises in Turkey. It 
recently developed and partly implemented a new strategy which generated 
substantial interest in the general public and academic circles. This thesis is a 
limited attempt to document this process.
No report or study is available on the assumptions and targets of Sumerbank's new 
strategy . Actually it was not developed as a result of a detailed strategic analysis 
and design, but as policy responses of a new management team to some urgent 
problems. It is usually called the 're-organization' of Sumerbank, but it is actually a 
strategic change in the orientation of Sumerbank.
As the process is not documented, the main information source of the thesis is a set 
of interviews conducted with the members of the new team. This information was 
supplemented with some unpublished reports on the operations of Sumerbank. The 
're-organization' of Sumerbank continues at present. There are plans to substantially 
re-structure and privatize Sumerbank. The results of this re-structuring operation on 
the part of the government is difficult to guess at present.
The thesis is organized into five sections including this introduction. In the next 
section, the concepts of environment, environmental change and strategic 
responses to such changes are discussed. The third section gives a history of 
Sumerbank and discusses the environmental changes it faced in the recent past. 
The fourth section gives an account of the policy actions adopted by Sumerbank 
after 1984 in response to these changes. Finally, the thesis concludes with a 
summary of findings.
2. THE ENVIRONMENT, CHANGE AND STRATEGIC RESPONSE
2.1. Environment and Change^
A large number of factors affect the firm within a given environment. Moreover, these 
factors interact with each other. There are many ways to organize different 
environmental factors for analysis and diagnosis. One approach is to divide the 
environment into a number of 'sectors'. Such categories as socio-economic, 
technological, supplier, competitor and governmental 'sectors' are used commonly. 
In what follows, we briefly describe the factors which affect the firm in each of these 
sectors.
2.1.1. Socio-economic sector
There are a variety of factors which affect the demand for products and services and 
the costs of producing them. These factors may be classified as economic, 
demographic, geographical and social factors.
Economic factors: The state of the economy at present and in the future can affect 
the prospects and the strategies of the firm. The specific economic factors that the 
firms should analyze include the following:
The stage of the business cycle, that is whether the economy is in a 
depression, recession, recovery or boom;
The inflationary or deflationary trends;
Economic policies, especially monetary and fiscal policies;
Fiscal policies, especially corporate and income taxes;
Trade policies, especially tariffs and exchange rate policies.
This section draws on Glueck and Jauch (1904:90ff).
Each of the above factors can help or hinder the achievement of the objectives of a 
firm and lead to success and failure of a particular strategy.
Demographic factors: The analysis of demographic factors is important in 
determining the demand for products and services. Economists and marketing 
experts often refer to demographic factors as primary demand lectors. Among the 
important characteristics of the population which should l)e analyzed while 
developing a strategy for a firm are the following:
The growth rate of the population and its segments;
The age, employment, income distribution of the population:
Urban and rural distribution of the population.
Geographical factors: A firm produces and distributes in different geographical 
locations. An effective strategist should hence continuously evaluate the locations in 
which the firm operates to identify opportunities and problems. According to this 
evaluation, the strategist may propose
New locations to add to present locations;
Relocation of certain premises to new locations;
Closing of certain premises;
Moving corporate headquarters to a new region.
The above types of decisions will naturally involve a careful analysis of economic, 
business, demographic and physical factors which characterize a geographical 
location.
Social factors: The last group of socio-economic factors which should be
considered relates to the values and attitudes of the customers and employees. 
These values translate into life styles which affect the demand for products and
services. The values and attitudes are also important in the behavior of the 
employees.
A successful strategy should take into account these values and attitudes. The firm 
should monitor the changes in educational levels, social trends, new ideas and even 
fashions in order to assess their likely impact. The firm may then consider modifying 
its product and marketing strategies. The firm may also attempt to influence its 
customers to adopt desirable values and attitudes through public relations efforts. A 
particular strategy may also call for the changes in the behavior of the managers and 
the employees, especially of those having direct relations with customers.
2.7.2. Technological sector
Besides examining socio-economic factors for their possible impact on products, 
markets or ways of conducting business, the firm should also search rhe 
environment for new technologies relating to its raw materials, operations, products 
and services. New technologies can offer major opportunities for the profitability of 
the firm. Conversely, new technologies, if employed by the competitors, may 
threaten the market share or even the very existence of the firm.
Not all industries are likely to be equally affected by technological change. Some 
industries are more volatile in technology than others. Strategists in industries 
subject to rapid technological change should be more alert in assessing the impacts 
of new technologies than those in technologically stable industries.
2.1.3. Supplier sector
A firm procures the inputs it employs in production of goods and services from 
many suppliers. As the complexity of the product increases, as exemplified by the 
automotive industry, the number of such suppliers may reach hundreds.
The common practice in modern industries is to sub-contract for most of the parts of 
a particular product and produce those parts which may be produced with least cost 
and/or higher quality. This mode of operation provides a flexibility in production 
planning and cost control.
Hence, a firm should keep under constant review the costs and availability of inputs 
it procures (or it might procure) from suppliers. As a result of these reviews, 
following actions may be considered:
Sub-contracting certain parts of a particular product to suppliers 
which may produce it with least cost or with better quality;
Shift from a particular supplier to another if the latter Is expected to 
provide a better service;
Changes in relations with existing suppliers, e.g. in prices, payment 
terms, delivery schedules, quality standards.
2.1.4. Competitor sector
The state of competition a firm faces is an important dimension of the environment. 
Three factors need to be examined regarding competition: entry and exit of major 
competitors; substitutes for current products and services; and strategic changes 
implemented by major competitors.
Entry and exit of competitors: Competitors do come and go. The firm should 
analyze the likely impacts of entry of new competitors and exit of old ones. In the
case of new competitors the firm should consider actions to guard its market share, 
technological position and its image in the minds of its customers. If a competitor 
exits from the industry, the firm should consider actions to capture the market share 
of that particular firm. Moreover, the firm should (i) carefully analyze the strategic 
reasons affecting the entry and exit of competitors, and (ii) modify its own strategies 
according to this analysis.
Substitutes for current products: The competitors of the firm are not only confined 
to the other firms producing the same product as the firm, but also to those 
producing substitutes. In the case of substitutes, the characteristics of the substitute 
may be changed by the other firm in such a way to increase the 'degree of 
substitution' with the product of the firm. Hence the consumers may select this 
substitute which became more similar to the product the firm is selling and capture 
part of its market share.
Strategies of competitors: Product, market, pricing and advertising strategies of the 
competitors should also be continuously monitored for their likely impacts. A 
competitor may target a particular market segment, population group etc and may 
intensify its investments, product development, marketing efforts in that direction. 
An early understanding of such strategic decisions will help the firm to develop 
counter-strategies.
2.1.5. Governmental Sector
Governmental policies affect the way a business operates through legislation and 
regulations in such matters as wages and prices, taxes, employment conditions, 
health and safety at workplace, accounting principles, construction specifications
etc. These laws and regulations change continuously forcing the firm to devote 
substantial resources to following, evaluating, and implementing them.
Apart from these general governmental actions, governments do have industrial 
policies which favour certain industries and types of businesses. They provide 
explicit or implicit subsidies to these industries and they protect these industries 
through tariffs and other measures. Such actions of the governments increase or 
decrease the opportunity set of a particular firm.
The governments are also big consumers of products and services. Hence the level 
and composition of governmental spending directly affects the demand for the 
products of a particular firm. This effect may be direct or indirect. The government 
may either directly purchase the products of the firm or the governmental purchases 
may indirectly induce an increase in the demand through input-output relations 
between firms.
2.2. Strategic Responses to Environmental Change
Every firm has some sort of a strategy or a set of strategies. Whether the strategy is 
a detailed document or implicit in the minds and practices of the managers, it 
depends on certain assumptions about the environment.
As evident from the above discussion, the environment of a firm changes 
continuously. These changes are also interrelated, one change leading to others in 
other environmental sectors.
A business firm should continuously monitor these changes in the environment and 
their interrelations and analyze which strategic assumptions are invalidated with the 
advent of these changes. New assumptions should then be formulated and the 
overall strategy should be modified accordingly.
Hence, strategy development and.updating is also a continuous and complex 
process. Its complexity increases with the complexity of the business itself and 
frequency of change in environmental factors.
Different sets of assumptions produce different strategies. It is the task of the 
management to make a detailed analysis of these strategic alternatives and choose 
the most appropriate strategy given the new environmental factors.
Once a strategy is chosen, new resources should be allocated to the business and 
new otganizaliorial structures should be designed and put irito use. The planning 
and design of the latter is an important stage of the implementation of the chosen 
strategy.
Most of the above steps of strategy development and implementation is undertaken 
by the strategists. The strategists may be experts specialized in this field and/or the 
top management of the firm. Then comes the most important stage of strategy 
implementation, that is policy development and implementation.
Policy development is a process where the strategy is communicated to other parts 
of the firms, especially to subordinate managers.^ Policies are developed to ensure 
that
The strategy is implemented;
See Glueck and Jauch (1984:347ff)
There is a basis for control;
The amount of time top management spend making decisions is 
reduced:
Similar situations are handled consistently;
Coordination across units will occur where necessary.
Policy development is a crucial part of the strategy implementation. Without policies 
a well-formulated strategy may be implemented in a faulty way, hence damaging the 
objectives of the firm incorporated in the strategy. The lack of policies may lead to 
confusion among the managers about the direction the firm has to take, about the 
proper course of action in a particular situation.
Policies should be practical, workable and compatible with other policies. They 
should reflect present or desired company practices. Policies should be developed 
in areas critical to firm's success. Moreover, the amount of policy-making should 
reflect the present and future size and complexity of the busirress. A small business 
may operate with a few policies. However if it is a small business growing rapidly it 
should start formulating a greater number of policies in crucial business areas. A big 
firm will have a large set of policies in place. These policies should be kept under 
constant review so that they are in conformity with the strategy of the firm. Any 
problems emerging because of inappropriate policies should be dealt with quickly.
Policies may classified into a number of areas: financial and accounting, marketing, 
production-operations management, research and development, personnel, legal 
and public relations policies.
Financial and accounting policies: These policies relate to financing of the firms' 
activities and projects and to accounting methods to be employed.
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Among the financial policies, the most important ones relate to capital employed in 
the business. The capital may be acquired in the form of short-term and long-term 
debt or in the form of equity. The firm should have a set of policies about the 
composition of its capital in terms of above instruments. These policies should also 
be compatible with policies regarding to uses of capital. The firm should consider 
whether to buy or lease fixed assets. In the case of leasing, the working capital will 
increase, or alternatively, the need to borrow will decrease.
The firm must also chose among different accounting methods and practices. It may 
select LIFO (Last-In-First-Out), FIFO (First-In-First-Out) in the case of inventory 
accounting, or book value or market value of fixed assets. These accounting policies 
will have an impact on the after-tax profits of the firm.
Marketing policies: Marketing policies relate to the products, markets, distribution 
and promotion, and pricing.
The firm should develop policies about the products to be focused on, the new 
products to be developed, the markets to be targeted, the distribution channels, and 
the composition of promotional activities in terms of different media channels such 
as TV, newspapers, radio, direct-mail.
The most important set of marketing policies are related to pricing. In the case of 
new product, the firm should consider whether to price it below-cost to gain rapid 
sales volume or sufficiently above-cost to cover development expenses. In the case 
of established products, such policies as volume-discounts or different prices in 
different locations may be considered.
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Production-operations management policies: The firm should develop policies 
relating to existing capacity and its level of utilization. If the current production 
capacities are inadequate under the new strategy, investments in new capacity 
should be considered. A related question arises in the latter case, that is where to 
locate new facilities. Policies should also be developed on equipment purchases for 
both the old and new production facilities.
Another area of policy-making in production management relates to sourcing of 
inputs. The important decision in this regard is the make or buy question. This 
decision depends on comparative costs of making or buying and the availability of 
reliable suppliers.
Research and development policies: In the case of a business firm, research and 
development relating to new products and processes is an important function. The 
firm should have a detailed R & D policy which specifies whether tl le R & D efforts 
should be confined to products or processes, whether research should be basic or 
applied, whether the R & D should be offensive aiming at introducing new products 
to the market or be defensive following what the other firms has already introduced.
The above R & D policies should be compatible with the policies about the 
resources to be devoted to R & D. The latter may be set as a percentage of sales, 
gross profits etc.
Personnel, legal and public relations policies: These last three policy areas are also 
important for the smooth operation of a particular strategy.
A successful strategy should have a detailed human resources component. The firm 
should first consider whether the existing level and composition of human
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resources is adequate for the strategy. If new recruitment is needed the availability 
of the necessary work force with the required skills should be considered. The firm 
should than look into its policies regarding salaries, benefits, job evaluation and 
performance appraisal and consider the necessary revisions in these policies under 
the new strategy.
Possible legal issues should also be considered before the implementation of a 
particular strategy or policy. There may be cases where the legal position of a 
particular action is not clear-cut and the firm may wish to seek legal opinion or 
instructions from the authorities. In other cases, if the firms thinks that a particular 
legal question will cause problems it may decide to drop the policy concerned.
Public relations policies have an impact on the image of the firm in the minds of the 
general public, not only in the minds of its customers. Every firm of a respectable 
size should have a set of public relations policies. Some of these policies may be 
directed to the community where the facilities are located. Other policies may be 
directed to general public or policy-makers in the government.
Another set of public relations policies may be needed in the case of bad publicity. A 
firm may be involved in the production of a dangerous product, its research and 
selling policies may raise ethical questions, and it may receive the attention of media 
and general public for these practices. The firm should react quickly to these issues 
and present its viewpoint to the public to limit the damage to its public image.
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3.SUMERBANK AND STRATEGIC CHALLENGES
3.1. Brief History of Sumerbank^
/
Sumerbank was established on July 11, 1933. The law establishing Sumerbank 
assigned it a very broad task: To manage the existing state industrial enterprises on 
the one hand and to establish new enterprises on the other hand. Given this task, 
the law stated the following objectives for Sumerbank:
To assist in the industrialization of Turkey by utilizing national 
resources:
To cooperate with other state and private enterprises in establishing 
industries which are given high priority in the industrialization 
programme of the State;
To take the necessary actions to train the personnei needed in 
industrial enterprises:
To prepare studies and projects of industrial enterprises to be 
established with the equity participation of the State.
As evident from above, Sumerbank was established as the principal instrument for 
the realization of the industrialization strategy of the Republic. Its task was not 
limited to a particular industry or a given set of projects.
Sumerbank had also a unique structure. As its name implies, it was established as a 
bank instead of an industrial holding company. The principal purpose of this 
arrangement was to mobilize deposits from the general public and to use these 
funds for industrial investments. Hence Sumerbank established a separate banking 
division with its own branch network.
This section draws on Sumerbank (1986).
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The original plan for Sumerbank also included retail activities in the form of a chain 
of stores. These stores were established to sell the products of Sumerbank.
Hence Sumerbank may be best analyzed in three divisions, namely manufacturing, 
banking and retailing.
3.1.1. Manufacturing
At the very start, four existing industrial enterprises were transferred to Sumerbank. 
These were
Bakirkoy Cotton Mill;
Feshane Woolen Min'*;
Hereke Silk and Woolen Mill ;^
Beykoz Leather and Shoe Factory.
The above four enterprises were quite old, all established in 19th century. Feshane 
started its operations in 1836, Hereke in 1843, and Bakirkoy in 1850.
The fifth industrial enterprise, the ownership of which was transferred to Sumerbank 
in 1934, was Bünyan Carpet Factory. Bünyan was established in 1927 and was one 
of the first industrial enterprises of the new Republic.
After this initial stage, Sumerbank started its own industrial investments and 
established a number of factories:
Kayseri Cotton Mill, 1935;
The first paper factory in Turkey, İzmit Paper Factory, which started 
its operations in 1936;
The first printed cotton fabric factory, Nazilli Printed Fabric Mill, 
1937;
4 Feshane is now called as Defterdar Woolen Mill.
5 As of 1986 Hereke operates as two enterprises. One is called the Hereke Woolen Mill, the other 
Hereke Carpets.
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Ereğli Cotton Mill, 1937;
The first modern woolen mill, Merinos (Bursa) Woolen Mill, 1938; 
Gemlik Artificial Silk and Viscose Factory, 1937 
Malatya Printed Fabric Mill, 1939.
As evident from above, in the first 6 years [1934-1939] of its operation, Sumerbank 
had implemented an active policy of investment and had established seven modern 
industrial enterprises. Moreover its investments were not oniy limited to textiles, but 
also covered paper, iron and steel.®
The Second World War slowed the investment programme of Sumerbank. 
Sumerbank was able to include the following four enterprises in its portfolio in 
1940s:
İsparta Carpet Factory, 1943 
Adana Cotton Mill, 1946 
Taskopru Jute Mill, 1947 
Adana Cotton Ginning Mill, 1949
The İsparta Carpet was first established in 1926 and was transferred to Sumerbank 
in 1943. Adana Cotton Mill was also a transfer. Hence Sumerbank established only 
two enterprises in this period, Taskopru and Adana Ginning, and these represented 
a relatively small capital outlay.
1950s was the second expansion period of Sumerbank. It established the following 
7 enterprises in this period;
Denizli Cotton Miii, 1953 
Izmir Printed Fabric Mill, 1953 
Erzincan Cotton Mill, 1954 
Diyarbakir Wool and Carpet Factory, 1954.
Bergama Cotton Industry, 1954
6 İzmit Paper Factory was later transferred to SEKA. Sumerbank also established the Karabük
Steel Works which remained under Sumerbank ownership until its transfer to TDCI.
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Karaman Cotton Mill, 1955
Turkey Raw Wool and Mohair Corporation, 1955^.
The Bergama Cotton in the above iist represented a new trend on the part of 
Sumerbank. Sumerbank established this modern plant with the equity participation 
of local interests. Sumerbank hoids a 72.3 % stake in this corporation.
Sumerbank further expanded its operations in the 1960s with the foilowing 9 
enterprises:
Manisa Cotton Industry, 1960°
Salihli Valonia and Valex Plant, 1961°
Antalya Cotton Industry, 1961^°
Yildiz Porcelain Factory, 1962^ ^
Kahraman Maras Cotton Mill, 1963’^
Eskişehir Printed Fabric Mill, 1965 
Tarsus Textile Dyes Factory, 1966 
Adiyaman Cotton Mill, 1967 
Nevşehir Cotton Mill, i967.
With the completion of above investments, Sumerbank had a manufacturing 
portfolio of 31 enterprises. The investments in 1970s and early 1980s were confined 
to technological modernization for the purpose of vertical integration of these 
enterprises. Hence, the investment in new plants was limited to three small shoe
7 This enterprise Is owned 99 % by Sumerbank. It started operations In 1955 and was 
incorporated In 1984. It has two factories, Sanll Urfa Wool Scouring and Yarn Spinning [Yapagi Yikama ve 
Yun Ipligi] Factory and Afyon/Sincanll Mohair [Tiftik] Tops Factory. It Is the largest purchaser of raw wool 
and mohair in Turkey.
8 Sumerbank has a 84.5 % share in this corporation.
9 This plant was originally established in 1955. It was transferred to Sumerbank in 1961. It 
produces valex from valonia [palamut] which is used as a chemical In leather Industry.
10 Sumerbank has a 81.6 % share in this corporation.
11 Yildiz Porcelain was established in 1892 by Sultan Abdulhamid the Second and remained 
operational until 1908. It remained closed between 1908-1960. In 1960 it was transferred to Sumerbank 
which opened it in 1962 after a complete rehabilitation.
12 This factory was established In 1963 by local interests and the ownership was transferred to 
Sumerbank in 1968.
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factories, one artificial leather factory, a small cotton mill which only produces cotton 
yarn, and a wool yarn factory:
Diyarbakir Cotton Mill, 1978
Van Leather and Shoe Factory, 1982
Çanakkale Artificial Leather Factory, 1982
Sarikamis Shoe Factory, 1982
Tercan Shoe Factory, 1982
Pertek Wool Yarn (Carpet Yarn) Plant, 1983
As evident from the above list of enterprises, Sumerbank is a formidable industrial 
conglomerate. Its industrial portfolio is not limited to the above list of enterprises. It 
has equity participations in 32 other companies in which it owns different 
percentages of the shares.^®
Sumerbank is the largest textile producer in Turkey. Its share in total cotton yarn 
production of Turkey is 16.4 %, 16 % in cotton fabrics, 8 % in wool yarns, 15 % in 
woolen fabrics, 2 % in hand-woven carpets and 2.5 % in machine-woven carpets. It 
also produces 11 % of shoes. It employs around 28,000 workers in its 
manufacturing establishments.
3.1.2. Banking
As said previously, Sumerbank was established as a deposit-taking bank. It was 
given the task of collecting deposits from the general public and employing them in 
industrial investments.
13 Significant Sumerbank equity participations are Van Yun Ipligi Sanayii A.S. (48%). SUTI 
Sumerbank Tekstil İsletme A.S. (40%), Oralgim Orta Anadolu Giyim Sanayi A.S. (40%), BASF-Sumerbank 
Kimya Sanayi A.S. (40%). Mannesman-Sumerbank Boru Endüstri A.S. (35.7%), Balikesir Pamuklu Dokuma 
Sanayi A.S. (21%), Yifas Yeşilyurt Tekstil Sanayi A.S. (15.3%), Koyteks Yatirim Holding A.S. (15%), and 
Sidas Sivas Dokuma Sanayi A.S. (15%).
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However, Sumerbank management never acted as a banker and was unsuccessful 
in realizing the above objective. The bank remained a small in-house bank serving 
only to Sumerbank industrial and retail activities. The bank had only three branches 
until 1950 which increased to 16 between 1950-60 and to 23 between 1960-75. As a 
result, its deposits remained quite small. The bank provided short-term credits and 
banking facilities to Sumerbank enterprises. For this reason, branches were 
established near the manufacturing enterprises.
The number of branches increased quite rapidly after 1975 and reached 42 in 1980 
and 44 in 1988. The banking division became relatively more active in 1980s and the 
total assets of the bank have grown rapidly. However, this expansion was mainly 
due to the increase in time-deposits which Sumerbank attracted with high interest 
rates.
3.1.3. Retailing
Sumerbank established its first shops under the title of 'Domestic Goods Markets' 
[Yerli Mallar Pazari]. These shops proved quite popular and Sumerbank increased 
their number under the "Sumerbank" name. The shops were dedicated to selling 
only Sumerbank products, namely textiles, shoes and carpets.
The number of shops was 39 in 1940, 50 in 1950, 151 in 1960, 194 in 1970. A rapid 
expansion occurred in 1970s and the number of shops reached 458 in 1980.
As of 1988, Sumerbank has 465 shops all over Turkey. The Sumerbank chain is the 
biggest in Turkey. The retail network covers 87.2 % of the Turkish population. No 
other chain reaches even one-tenth of its size. In 1987, total sales of Sumerbank 
through these retail network was 189 billion TL
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3.2. Changes in the Environment of Sumerbank
Sumerbank is one of the oiclest state economic enterprises in Turkey. As 
summarized above, it inherited industriai enterprises estabiished in tiie Ottoman 
times and in the first years of Republic. Subsequently, it was active as an industrial 
conglomerate and as a retailer in every period of the Republican era.
As the Turkish economy and society transformed itself, the environment of 
Sumerbank has changed quite rapidly. Sumerbank experienced many strategic 
challenges due to this rapid transformation. It was successful in meeting some of 
these challenges with new strategies and policies in the past. However, as a state 
economic enterprise under heavy government control, its efforts in this direction 
were constrained by many factors. As a result, it was unable to adapt itself to its new 
environment especially after the 1960s -  a period of rapid industrialization in Turkey.
At the end of 1970s, Sumerbank was regarded as an old-fashioned state economic 
enterprise which accomplished its economic mission. With its plants located in less- 
developed parts of the country, with product range and prices appealing to low- 
income customers, it was at best fulfilling a social mission.
The economic reforms of 1980 again substantially changed the environment of 
Sumerbank. The new policy was forcing the state economic enterprises to be more 
profit-oriented. In this new environment, Sumerbank could not receive subsidies 
from the government, and, especially after 1983, could not obtain cheap credits from 
the Central Bank. The governmental policies were giving preference to exports, an 
area where Sumerbank had little experience.
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Moreover, Sumerbank was in need of substantial new investment funds in the 
1980s. Its plants were employing technologies dating back to 1930s. It still had 
some uncompleted investment projects especially in less-developed parts of 
Turkey. The government was reluctant to provide the required funds and was 
forcing Sumerbank to generate the funds internally or from international sources.
The new economic environment, hence, was not very supportive of Sumerbank. 
Moreover, as Sumerbank was unable to implement the necessary policies starting 
with 1960s, it had an accumulated stock of problems. The new environment 
increased the negative effect of these accumulated problems on the profitability and 
viability of Sumerbank. In what follows, the new environmental factors affecting 
Sumerbank in early 1980s are summarized.
Economic factors: The Turkish economy experienced an economic crisis in late 
1970s. As a result, the government put into effect a series of economic measures in 
January 1980. These measures were followed by new measures and policies in the 
latter years. The Turkish Lira was devaluated continuously and the interest rates 
were increased substantially. The prices of goods and services produced by state 
economic enterprises were increased to reflect the costs and to eliminate 
government subsidies. The policies also aimed at limiting domestic demand and 
increasing the exports. The government subsequently reduced import protection by 
decreasing tariffs and eliminating import quotas.
The effect of these measures on industry as well as on Sumerbank was quite 
substantial. The decrease in domestic demand limited the possibility of selling 
goods to a protected domestic market. Most of the enterprises were not equipped to 
export goods abroad. The constant devaluation of TL increased the cost of imported
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inputs. The interest rates were kept above inflation which increased the cost of 
credit. Simultaneously, the government reduced the amount of cheap credits given 
to state economic enterprises and private sector through Central Bank and other 
state banks. As Turkish enterprises were under-capitalized, in need of credits for 
both working capital and investment projects, this last measure had substantial 
effects on their costs and investment plans.
The new economic policies hence changed the environment of Sumerbank in a 
negative direction. Sumerbank was accustomed to selling goods to domestic 
market, not to export markets. It was depending on cheap state credits for working 
capital and investment projects.
However, the new economic policy also had a beneficial effect on Sumerbank. It 
liberated the state economic enterprises from price controls. Hence Sumerbank was 
now able to set its prices according to costs.
Demographic factors: Sumerbank was established in a period when the majority of 
the Turkish population was in rural areas. Its product range was determined 
according to the demands of this largely rural population. With the subsequent 
urbanization in Turkey, Sumerbank was faced with changing demands which it was 
unable to meet with its oid product range.
The increase in the per-capita income of the population further decreased the 
demand for Sumerbank's products. Hence while Sumerbank was serving the 
demands of larger proportion of the population in the 1940s and 1950s, its customer 
base was more limited in the later years. Typical Sumerbank customers were 
basically from the low-income and middle-aged segments of the population.
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Demographic factors also affected the retail network of Sumerbank. In the past, 
Sumerbank followed a strategy of opening a store in every small town of Turkey. 
Subsequent changes in the relative population of towns and cities and the above- 
mentioned changes in demand led to a decline in the demand of small shops. 
Sumerbank was under-represented in big cities with few big stores in Istanbul, 
Ankara and Izmir.
Geographic factors: Sumerbank from the very start followed a policy of locating its 
plants and stores all over Turkey. The government has given Sumerbank the task of 
investing in developing parts of the country. It became the main employer in most of 
the towns and hence contributed substantially to local economies.^'*
In the early sateges, the selection of locations for plants was based on economic 
reasons. For instance, Merinos Factory was located in Bursa because the region 
was an important wool production center. Cotton Mills were located in cotton- 
producing regions. However, subsequently, Sumerbank was forced to invest in 
some small towns without much economic reason. Moreover, under political 
demands, it established very small plants in some locations which proved to be un­
economical.
One beneficial side-effect of this policy of spreading investments to different 
locations was acquiring a large land portfolio. As a result of rapid urbanization and 
the increase in real estate prices, the lands of some Sumerbank factories are now 
more valuable than the plants located on them.
14 Sumerbank plants were also seen as 'civilization centers' In the early years. They had modern
housing, restaurants, ball-rooms, tennis courts etc. Hence they introduced modern ways of life to local 
populations.
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As a result, Sumerbank has a geographically dispersed set of factories some of 
which are un-economical and as a by-product a very valuable real estate portfolio. A 
successful strategy for Sumerbank should take into account the problem of un­
suitable locations and opportunities provided by the real-estate portfolio.
Social factors: Some of the ■ social factors affecting Sumerbank are related to 
demographic factors discussed above. Basically, as a result of population and 
income growth, the values, demands and life styles of the population changed 
drastically in the past decades and Sumerbank was very slow in adapting to these 
changes. Hence, it became a supplier to lower income groups and rural areas, and 
its consumer base in urban population contracted continuously. It was very 
unpopular among the higher income groups and especially urban youth.
A social trend which Sumerbank tried to respond to in the past was the preference 
of the people for ready-made garments. It made attempts after 1960s to add ready­
made garment lines to its cotton and wool plants. But since it was short of 
necessary funds to invest in modern garment technology while the private sector 
was establishing modern plants, its products were not of high standards. Hence 
these products also appealed to its lower income customers.
The corporate culture of Sumerbank was also out-of-date. It was run by civil servants 
who were not profit- and customer-oriented. Even the lower-level employees were 
regarding themselves as public servants and not part of a business establishment. 
The level of customer service in the retail shops was very low compared to private 
shops.
The social factors hence posed another challenge to Sumerbank management. The 
management should have taken the new social trends into account to widen the
24
customer base and simultaneously change the corporate culture in a way to better 
serve the customers.
Technological factors: Sumerbank was the pioneer in the Turkish textile industry in 
the early years. However, the private textile industry developed quite rapidly after 
1950s. The Sumerbank was slow in investing in new technologies in this period. As 
a result, the technology of Sumerbank is quite old now.
Sumerbank had responded to its technological problems with a modernization 
programme, called Rationalisation and Modernization Programme (RMP) developed 
in the late 1970s. This programme was partly implemented with World Bank loans. 
The following quotations from BCG (1985) study reflect the state of technology in 
Sumerbank cotton plants after the implementation of RMP:
Sumerbank has eighteen cotton mills... These mills have, over the 
past few years, benefitted from an $ 85 million RMP programme... 
Cotton spinning: Sumerbank mills suffer by comparison with the 
private sector in that their spindles are somewhat older than those 
operating in the private sector... A detailed analysis of labour 
productivity in 1984 shows Sumerbank mills considerably under- 
performing the private sector...
Cotton weaving: Sumerbank's cotton weaving operations are 
handicapped by its looms. In comparison to looms in the organized 
private sector, these are both narrower (with 80% less than 1.6m 
wide, compared to 50% in the private sector) and older (with 55% 
over 20 years old, as against 20% in the private sector.
Cotton finishing: There has been considerable evolution in finishing 
technology in recent years ... the [Turkish] private sector has 
invested very heavily in finishing, and their finishing equipment is 
generally modern. In Sumerbank the opposite is true: finishing has 
suffered from a lack of investment and older than both spinning and 
weaving.
15 The Boston Consulting Group study, hereafter referred as BCG (1905), emphasizes this point
by calling for 'large scale cultural changes in organization'.
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Ready-made Garments: ...Sumerbank's RMG machinery is between 
6 and 12 years old. This means that it is somewhat older than 
average for the subsector, but despite this should be reasonably 
competitive, as RMG production depends on work flow organisation 
and worker skills, as on machinery age.
Knitting: Sumerbank has a knitting operation in Adiyaman, which 
relative to private sector is
large (about twice typical private sector scale) and 
modern (seven years old).
Adiyaman achieves high productivity levels..
Similar observations are made in the case of wool mills of Sumerbank in the BCG 
report. Hence, in summary, most Sumerbank operations are employing older 
technology compared to private sector and are recording lower productivity levels. 
This fact poses a major challenge for the Sumerbank management.
Suppliers: Sumerbank emphasized vertical-integration in its operations. Hence both 
cotton and wool operations are integrated and factories eiii'-;r produ-^e tffei; uwn 
raw material or obtain it from other Sumerbank factories. As the technology of 
Sumerbank operations are quite old and the factories are over-staffed, the 
production costs in most cases are higher than private operations. Hence, it is 
possible for some plants to reduce input costs if they are left free to obtain their 
inputs from outside suppliers. However, Sumerbank factories are not independent in 
their sourcing decisions. It is the policy of Sumerbank management to keep all its 
production lines operating, hence profitable factories use inputs from unprofitable 
factories to keep the latter in operation.
Sumerbank has also refrained from sub-contracting to lower cost producers. The 
only exception in this regard is ready-made garments. Sumerbank has seven mills 
with ready-made garment production capacity, but subcontracts most of its
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production to lower cost private producers. This has proved very profitable for 
Sumerbank. However, as observed in BCG (1985) report, this profitability derives 
from the state contracts. Such large buyers as army and police are, by government 
rules and regulations, forced to buy ready-made garments from Sumerbank. BCG 
concluded that if such rules change or Sumerbank is privatized, subcontracting may 
not be profitable.’®
In conclusion, another strategic challenge for Sumerbank management is whether 
to continue to source inputs from its own operations or to use outside sources, 
including subcontracting.
Competitors: It is already observed that Sumerbank, the pioneer in Turkish textiles 
industry, has now quite formidable competitors in the private sector. Private textile 
operations employ more modern technology, are not over-staffed, and hence more 
productive. They respond to fashion trends and market demands more quickly. In 
the 1980s the private textile producers became more export-oriented and now 
account for a major portion of Turkish exports. In contrast, Sumerbank is burdened 
with old plants, unprofitable operations, and a bureaucratic corporate cuiture.
The competitive Turkish textiles industry posed another challenge to Sumerbank 
management. A successful strategy was needed to strengthen the competitive 
position of Sumerbank.
Government: Sumerbank is affected by the governmental decisions at two levels. At 
the first level the governmental policies, especially economic ones, change the 
environment of Sumerbank substantially as they do change the enviroment of other
16 This happened in 1988 when army and police was left free in their purchasing decisions. Private
producers offered lower prices to the Army for army boots, and Army decided to supply part of its 
requirement from these producers.
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public and private firms. This was already discussed above. The second level of 
governmental actions that affect Sumerbank are those relating to state economic 
enterprises (SEEs). As Sumerbank is a SEE, it is regarded as an agent of 
government's economic and social policies. Its actions should take this fact into 
account.
The governmental policies limited every action of Sumerbank in the past. The 
locations of its plants were determined by government preferences. Its investment 
projects were subject to government approval, and it depended on government 
approved funds for investments. The management was not given the authority of 
closing unprofitable plants. It was not free to set prices without consulting the 
government. It was over-staffed because of the social policies of government, and it 
is was not free to hire and fire its employees. The salaries of Sumerbank staff was 
detei mined according to the state salary systam, asvJ !'er.oc the .■•..eng.-'ement could 
not offer market salaries to staff. As a result, the professional staff was leaving 
Sumerbank for higher-paying jobs in the private sector.
The above list of factors which limited the independence of Sumerbank 
management in taking business decisions was common to all SEEs. With the 1980 
reforms, the situation changed substantially. SEEs were requested to become more 
market-oriented and business-like. Price controls were abolished, the SEE 
managements were given more freedom in their decisions, and certain flexible 
arrangements were introduced for staffing and salaries. However, the reforms had 
also a negative side for SEEs. The subsidies they were getting from the state were 
reduced and they were forced to depend on internal funds for growth and 
investments. This was rather difficult for SEE managements who were accustomed
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to cheap credits for investments and working-capital. The n e w  policies needed a 
new management culture and policies on the part of SEE managements.
Hence, the last strategic challenge posed to Sumerbank management was to adapt 
to this new environment which provided both freedom of action and formidable 
constraints.
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4.SUMERBANK'S NEW STRATEGY
4.1. The New Strategy
The new environment created by 1980 economic reforms created a series of 
responses on the part of Sumerbank management in early 1980s. The management 
immediately realized that it could not continue with its substantial investment 
programme without state credits and therefore, reduced the number of new 
projects. It even left some projects under construction un-finished and completed 
only those small projects which were in advanced stages, such as the three shoe 
factories in Van, Sarikamis and Tercan.^^ The modernization of existing plants was 
given high priority and a Rationalisation and Modernization Programme (RMP) was 
developed. The RMP was implemented with funds frotr. a World Bank loan. The 
number of shops were kept almost at their 1980 level. (Sumerbank actually opened 
9 new shops between 1980 and 1985, in contrast to 264 new shops between 1970 
and 1980.) The banking operations was given a high priority to collect deposits to be 
used as credit in Sumerbank manufacturing and retail operations. The employment 
growth was limited and Sumerbank was able to reduce its total number of 
employees from its 1980 peak of 46,897 to 42,177 in 1985.
Despite these operations the profitability of Sumerbank decreased. While it recorded 
a profit of around 417 million TL in 1981, it recorded a loss of 2,305 million TL in 
1982. The loss was reduced to 121 million TL in 1983.
17 Some of the un-finished plants were either leased or sold to private sector by the government.
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1984 was an important year in Sumerbank history. The new government completely 
cut the cheap credits Sumerbank was drawing from the Central Bank. These credits 
were reduced relatively after 1980 but still reached the level of 26 billion TL in 1983. 
Hence Sumerbank was cut short of an important source of credit. On the other 
hand, its exports reached to around 39 million US dollars, a considerable success 
compared to around 20 million in 1980 and 9 million in 1981.
The year 1984 also saw a management change in Sumerbank. In November 1984 
the government appointed a new General Manager, Dr. Erkan Tapan. He was the 
first General Manager from outside Sumerbank and state bureaucracy. He brought 
to Sumerbank substantial managerial experience acquired in the Turkish private 
sector. Dr. Tapan assembled a new management team and immediately started a 
highly visible re-organisation plan.
The strategy of the new management team was basically oriented to change the 
corporate culture in Sumerbank and to restore its profitability through a marketing 
campaign. An organizational restructuring was first implemented in the headquarters 
and a successful public relations campaign was started to enhance the image of 
Sumerbank in the eyes of the general public. New lines of merchandise were added 
to the traditional product range and new consumer segments such as youth and 
children were targeted for sales expansion. The strategy was successful in 
addressing some of the strategic challenges summarized in the previous section.
In what follows, the actions of the new management team are discussed briefly.
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4.2. Strategies and Policies after 1984 
4.2.1. Organizational Policies
The management first analyzed the organizational set-up of Sumerbank and 
substantially re-structured it to better coordinate the activities of the conglomerate.
As part of this re-organization, the number of Assistant General Managers (AGMs) 
were increased from 2 to 5. One AGM was made responsible from Manufacturing, 
the second AGM from Administrative and Financial Affairs, the third AGM from 
Marketing, the fourth from Banking, and the fifth AGM from Carpets and Developing 
Regions.
12 departments were also established to achieve better coordination of operations:
Planning Department, reporting to the General Manage.^ 
responsible from production planning, cost effectiveness studies, 
purchasing, computer systems, and organization and method 
studies.
Textiles Department, reporting to AGM (Manufacturing), responsible 
from all cotton and wool operations of Sumerbank. These 
operations are grouped into 5 groups, each headed by a Group 
Head.
Leather and Chemicals Department, repotting to AGM 
(Manufacturing), responsible from shoe and leather factories. The 
factories report to two Group Heads. Yildiz Porcelain is also 
coordinated by this Department.
Projects and Investments Department, reporting to AGM 
(Manufacturing), responsible from investment projects, 
construction, engineering services, and industrial engineering. 
Administration Department, reporting to AGM (Administration and 
Finance), responsible from personnel, training, public relations, 
communications, health and welfare.
Finance Department, reporting to AGM (Administration and 
Finance), responsible from accounting, finance, budgeting, cash 
flow planning, and equity participations.
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Export Department, reporting to AGM (Marketing), responsible from 
export marketing and export operations.
Sales Department, reporting to AGM (Marketing), responsible from 
domestic sales including retail sales through Sumerbank shops, 
sales to governmental agencies and distribution.
Carpets Department, reporting to AGM (Carpets and Developing 
Regions), responsible from carpet operations of Sumerbank. 
Developing Regions Department, reporting to AGM (Carpets and 
Developing Regions), responsible from implementing Sumerbank 
projects in Developing Regions.^®
Banking Department, reporting to AGM (Banking), responsible from 
bank branches grouped into five regions.
Banking Support Services Department, reporting to AGM (Banking), 
responsible from foreign and domestic banking operations, and 
administration.
Apart from the above basic organizational structure, a post of Secretary-General was 
created. The General Manager also employed a group of experts directly reporting 
to him and working on special projects.
This new organizational structure reflected the desire of the new management team 
to better coordinate the diverse activities of Sumerbank. It was designed to create 
new units to focus on certain new activities. For instance, within the Sales 
Department a 'Group' was created for retail sales. This Group had a section for 
department stores and another section for specialized stores. This arrangement, as 
will be seen below, reflected the new marketing strategy of targeting certain 
consumer groups.
However, the new structure has not solved the basic organizational problem of 
Sumerbank. It was very complex and centralist. There were four layers of
18 The government has given Sumerbank the task of implementing projects in certain priority 
regions [Kalkinmada Öncelikli Yöreler] to increase employment and Income. These projects are basically 
hand-woven carpet and handicraft projects and are funded by the government from a special 
Development Fund.
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management in the headquarters: AGM [Genet Mudur Yardimcisi], Department 
Head [Daire Baskani], Group Head [Grup Baskani] and Section Head [Mudur], The 
number of Section Heads was increased from 34 to 60 under the new organization 
structure to encourage specialization. All heads of factories and retail stores were 
reporting to the headquarters through a Group Head or Section Head. As the factory 
heads were running large operations with hundreds of employees, this top-heavy 
organization structure limited their ability to communicate with the headquarters. 
The decisions they were expecting from the headquarters were not taken as quickly 
as they would like. They were not given more operational freedom in their day-to-day 
operations under the new set-up.
Moreover, because of this centralist tendency of coordinating everything at the 
headquarters at the level of departments, the functional responsibility of 
Departments were not very clear. For instai ice, tho Plan!::·'·.:, Dcpartmoi ·:, repoiting 
directly to the General Manager, was not only responsible from planning-type 
operations but from all purchasing of Sumerbank from outside suppliers. Even the 
Adana Ginning Factory was reporting to this Department through the Purchasing 
Organisation. Another example was that the Communications Section and Health 
Services Sections were reporting to the same Group Head.
The new General Manager has staffed some of the newly-created positions from 
outside Sumerbank. However, the number of such appointments were kept limited 
and most new positions were staffed from within Sumerbank. This policy was 
designed to boost the morale of the employees of Sumerbank who were afraid of 
drastic personnel changes under the new management. As Sumerbank is a very 
closely-knit community with most of its employees serving it for long years, new 
managers from outside might have caused problems. The new management
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avoided this problem and decided to follow a policy of gradual change in operations 
and corporate culture.’^
4.2.2. Marketing Policies
The central strategic action of the new management was to turn Sumerbank into a 
more market-oriented operation. In the face of funding requirements of Sumerbank, 
it was realized that a rapid increase in sales was the only way to increase cash-flow.
The‘first action taken in this area was to initiate a big promotional campaign to 
change the image of Sumerbank. Sumerbank had little promotional activity and the 
general public, apart from its traditional customers, was unaware of its product 
range and prices. It was perceived as a low-price low-quality retailer appealing to 
lower-income consumers.
An advertising campaign was started both in the TV and newspapers which 
emphasized the traditional strengths of Sumerbank: a dependable producer with 
sensible pricing and a retail network covering Turkey. The main theme of the 
campaign was the historical characteristics of Sumerbank: Sumerbank is a company 
with a long tradition of service to the Turkish consumer. It was the main supplier of 
textiles to the Turkish public in the past and the previous generations depended on 
it for their needs. A slogan was developed to reflect this historical relationship of the 
Turkish consumer with Sumerbank: / love Sumerbank!
19 An example of adaptation problems of new managers to Sumerbank culture had emerged in 
late 1988 under another management team. They recruited as AGM for Banking an executive from one of 
the private banks. The new AGM had plans to change the direction of banking operations which was 
approved by the management. However, he was not able to obtain quick decisions from the Board in 
most cases and resigned immediately. He served only around a month in his new job.
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This advertising campaign was very successful in re-building the image of 
Sumerbank. The campaign has also given to the public the message that, under its 
new management. Suinerbank was turning itself into a dynamic enterprise 
responsive to the demands of the consumer.
Concurrent with this promotion campaign, the new management team also analyzed 
the characteristics of the consumer base of Sumerbank. It was found that 
Sumerbank was mainly selling its products to low-income, middle-aged customers. 
The younger segments of the population and middle-income consumers were not 
among the customers of Sumerbank.
Hence, it was decided that Sumerbank would target this consumer segments for 
sales expansion. This new strategy was implemented in three stages. Firstly, a new 
range of ready-made garments were designed and produced for the middle-income 
consumers. As this consumer group was fashion-conscious, the new line of 
products were designed to reflect the latest fashion trends. Both the quality of 
material and the standard of workmanship were higher compared to traditional 
Sumerbank-produced garments. This new set of products were given a distinct 
image under the brand name New Line [Yeni Çizgi], An advertising campaign, very 
similar to the campaigns run by higher-priced private ready-made garment 
producers, was undertaken to promote this new line of products.
Secondly, Sumerbank designed a set of garments for the youth under the brand 
name Young & Young [Gene ve Gene] targeted to young consumers. This line was 
designed especially for university youth and was marketed separately. Sumerbank 
followed a different marketing strategy in this case. With an advertising campaign, it 
gave the message to the university students that Sumerbank trusts the youth and
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will sell its specially designed goods to them under an installment sale program. The 
university students were given the option of purchasing garments and shoes to a 
certain limit immediately from Sumerbank stores and paying in monthly installments.
Thirdly, Sumerbank targeted babies and children as another potential consumer 
group. A set of baby and children's clothing and toys were marketed under the 
brand name Flying Balloon [Ucan Balon]. This line also had its own advertising 
campaign.
Sumerbank management also started to make some alterations in the retail network. 
Some shops were identified as department stores selling fabrics, ready-made 
garments, shoes, porcelain, and carpets. Some shops were turned into specialized 
shops selling only garments, fabrics, or carpets. As seen above, special Sections 
were established in the headquarters to coordinate these two types of shops. Most 
of the shops were re-decorated to make them similar to private shops. Sumerbank 
also opened new shops in university campuses for Young & Young product line, and 
specialized shops for Flying Balloon product line.
As a result of this marketing campaign, Sumerbank succeeded in broadening its 
consumer base. Sumerbank has also not neglected its traditional customers, and 
promoted its traditional products with frequent price reductions. An example of the 
latter policy was selling shoes for 25,000 TL at the start of 1989, a figure 
substantially below the market prices.
Sumerbank also followed an export-oriented marketing strategy under the new 
management. Exports of Sumerbank, consisting of textile products produced in its 
own factories, amounted to US$ 66.5 million in 1987. This figure was US$ 34.5 
million in 1983, US$ 26.5 million in 1984, US$ 24.6 million in 1985, and US$ 43.1
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million in 1986. The Exports Department in the headquarters coordinated the export 
sales of Suinerbank, and, apart from Increasing the total volume of exports, was also 
successful in increasing the number of foreign countries Sumerbank is exporting.
4.2.3. Production-Operations Management Policies
Sumerbank's new marketing strategy depended on mostly ready-made garments. 
However, as discussed in the previous section, Sumerbank has limited ready-made 
garment producing capacity. The existing capacity is also not as efficient as that of 
the private producers. Because of the lack of investment funds, it was not possible 
for the management to invest in new capacity or in modernizing the existing plants. 
As a result, Sumerbank management depended on sub-contractors to produce the 
new product lines.
This proved to be a very profitable arrangement for Sumerbank. The private 
producers were supplying goods at comparatively low prices and they had the 
flexibility to produce new products in required quantities at a short notice. As 
Sumerbank's profit margins were lower than those of the private shops, Sumerbank 
was still able to sell these goods with lower prices compared to private shops.
The present Sumerbank management maintains that even if they have the funds to 
invest in ready-made garment production, they would not undertake such 
investments because of the profitability and flexibility of subcontracting 
arrangements. Private producers have lower overheads compared to Sumerbank 
establishments, and it is very difficult for Sumerbank to achieve such low overheads 
even if new investments are undertaken.
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4.2.4. Research and Development Policies
Research and development efforts of Sumerbank was institutionalized in the form of 
an R & D center in 1972. This center, located in Bursa, is called SAGEM [Sumerbank 
Arastirma, Geliştirme ve Eğitim Müessesi] and is also active in training of Sumerbank 
personnel.
The new management broadened the R & D activities of SAGEM in the direction of 
development of new products. SAGEM contributed to the above-mentioned 
marketing efforts of Sumerbank by designing new products. Furthermore, SAGEM 
followed technological trends in the world textile industry and evolved plans for the 
adaptation of these new technologies by Sumerbank enterprises. It also undertook 
studies to increase the overall productivity of Sumerbank operations, and to 
increase the quality of goods produced.
As Sumerbank became more export-oriented, production of goods according to 
international standards gained in importance. SAGEM contributed to this process by 
following these standards and by helping the individual enterprises to make the 
necessary changes in their operations for producing according to these standards.
4.2.5. Personnel Policies
Sumerbank, as every state economic enterprise in Turkey, is over-staffed. Despite 
this problem, it is generally agreed that the quality of its technical staff, both 
professionals and workers, in textiles and shoes is quite high. However, it lacks the 
necessary skills in retailing and banking. The level of salaries of the staff is also low 
compared to private sector.
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In the 1980s, Sumerbank management introduced a numbe' of measures to solve 
these problems. Firstly, a limit on hiring was introduced '>nd as a result it was 
possible to reduce the total number of employees from 46,0')7 in 1980 to 42,177 in 
1985. in 1988 this figure came down to around 38,000. Secondly, the new 
regulations enacted by the government after 1983 provided Sumerbank with some 
flexibility in raising the salaries of the staff. Under new regulations, it was given the 
freedom to employ contractual employees with relatively higher salaries than the 
comparative civil service salaries. As a resuit, some existing employees chose to 
become contractual employees. Thirdly, under the new strategy, Sumerbank 
management ran a campaign to raise the productivity and motivation of the 
employees. Special efforts were made to train and motivate the employees in 
especially the retail network to better respond to customers.
4.2.6. Legal Policies
As already mentioned above, the government has given more freedom to the 
managements of SEEs after 1980. This took the form of eliminating numerous 
regulations on hiring and purchasing. The Boards of the SEEs were also given more 
freedom in decision-making. This legal environment was crucial for the 
implementation of the new strategy of Sumerbank.
The Sumerbank management, as a result of these changes in the regulations, has 
critically evaluated its own rules and regulations and made the necessary changes. 
These changes gave more freedom to factories and the headquarters departments 
especially in purchasing. The increase in subcontracting arrangements was also a 
result of the changes in the legal environment.
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The last and the most important legal change happened in 1907. With a decision of 
the Council of Ministers, Sumerbank was put in the list of SEEs to be privatized. The 
government shares in Sumerbank were transferred to the Housing Development 
and Public Participation Administration, the principal vehicle of the government in 
privatization, and a new holding company was established which was called 
Sumerbank Holding Incorporated. Hence Sumerbank became a corporation in the 
proper sense and its decisions were not subject to direct government interference. 
The Sumerbank Board of Directors were reconstituted with members who had 
experience in private sector.
The new legal arrangements also coincided with a change in the management of 
Sumerbank. Dr. Erkan Tapan resigned in early 1988 over a dispute with the Housing 
Development and Public Participation Administration on privatization strategy. A new 
General Manager, Mr. Ahmet Ozerdim, was appointed and new management team 
was constituted.
In January 1989, the Housing Development and Public Participation Administration 
appointed a consortium of advisors to provide consultancy services in the 
privatization of Sumerbank.
Hence as of 1989, Sumerbank entered into a new era as a state-owned corporation, 
the assets of which will be privatized in the 1990s.
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5. CONCLUSION
Sumerbank is the oldest state economic enterprise in Turkey established some 55 
years ago. It contributed significantly to the formation of the Turkish industrial 
infrastructure, especially in the field of textiles.
As every industrial enterprise with a long history, the environment of Sumerbank 
changed substantially in the past. Sumerbank was able to adapt to some of these 
changes, but was slow in adapting to most of them. Hence, at the start of 1980s, 
Sumerbank was a stagnant industrial conglomerate. It was not responsive to the 
changing customer demands and its customer base was limited to low-income 
segments of the population.
The 1980 economic reforms further aggravated these problems. The new freedom 
given to state economic enterprises was beneficial to Sumerbank. However it was 
also cut short of Government subsidies and cheap credits. Moreover, the new 
environment was very competitive.
The new management of Sumerbank, which took over in late 1984, evolved a 
strategy to respond to these environmental changes. The new strategy turned 
Sumerbank into a more market oriented enterprise. A number of marketing 
campaigns were implemented and new lines of products were designed and 
marketed. Sumerbank targeted new consumer groups such as middle-income, 
university youth, children groups in these campaigns. The new strategy also made 
changes in the organizational structure of Sumerbank, the rules and regulations and
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the personnel policies. It supported R & D efforts and made Sumerbank more 
dependent on subcontracting especially in the case of ready-made garments.
The new strategy was quite successful in broadening the customer base of 
Sumerbank and increasing both domestic and export sales. The image of the 
Sumerbank improved substantially in the eyes of the general public as a result of 
advertising campaigns.
However the new strategy was not able to solve all the problems of Sumerbank. 
Because of lack of funds, it was not possible to undertake major investments and 
hence improve the technology of Sumerbank which is quite old compared to private 
sector. As a result, the overall productivity of Sumerbank has not improved much 
under the new strategy.
Sumerbank became a holding company as of '^02'i .and .a new management team 
replaced the previous team who had implemented the strategy summarized in this 
thesis. The new holding company is in the privatization list of the government. In 
January 1989, The Housing Development and Public Participation Administration, 
the government agency implementing the privatization programme, had appointed 
advisors for the preparation of a master plan for the privatization of Sumerbank.
At this stage, it would be very difficult to forecast what could emerge out of this new 
initiative of the government. It is evident from the above that Sumerbank needs 
substantial investment to adapt to its new environment. As Sumerbank could not 
generate the required funds out of its operations, the funds should either be 
provided by the government or by some financing agency. At present, the 
government, as a general policy, is channeling its investabie funds to infrastructure 
projects, not to manufacturing. One may also expect that the textile goods
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manufacturing will not be in the priority list for public investment in the future even if 
this policy against tnanufacturing changes. As a result, the government thinks that it 
would be more appropriate to privatize Sumerbank and led the private sector 
undertake the necessary investments. This policy stance of the government also 
limits the ability of Sumerbank to procure funds from external sources like World 
Bank.
While the privatisation programme may change direction or discontinued by a future 
government, it would be highly improbable for Sumerbank to receive all the required 
investment funds. One open question is whether Sumerbank could partly generate 
these funds out of its operations. If Sumerbank management could implement a 
sensible strategy for an increase in profitability through some re-structuring of its 
operations, a future government might be willing to put into some fur\fls for 
investment funds. The record of Sumer bank in :i'tu pasi ri. .·. y tars th-.)ws that 
despite substantial efforts it was not possible to increase the profitability 
significantly.
Hence, the future of Sumerbank would very much depend on the governmental 
policies. At the one extreme, it may be expected that Sumerbank would be 
liquidated through privatization or other measures. At the other extreme, one may 
expect that Sumerbank would be modernized in technology through a combination 
of public, foreign and internal funds. The actual outcome would most probably be in 
between these two extremes.
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